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PLEADING
Demurrer-Condemnation-Necessary Allegations
Sease v. City of Spartanburg' held that when a landowner
brings an action to enjoin a condemnation proceeding, he must
allege and prove either (1) fraud; or (2) bad faith; or (3) clear
abuse of discretion. If his complaint fails to allege facts which
would constitute one of these three grounds, the complaint does
not state a cause of action.
After a landowner had obtained a temporary restraining order
pendente lite, her complaint against the city of Spartanburg was
dismissed when the trial judge sustained a demurrer by the city.
The complaint was based on four grounds: (1) that the proposed
condemnation would make ingress to, and egress from, plain-
tiff's remaining property difficult or impossible; (2) that the
proposed condemnation plan was "fantastic, unreasonable, un-
necessary, uncalled for and unwarranted"; (3) that it would be
a great detriment to plaintiff and would serve no useful purpose
to the city; (4) that plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
dismissal upon the demurrer by the city. The fact that the con-
demnation might affect access to other properties owned by
plaintiff would influence the amount of damages recoverable but
would not constitute a bar to the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain. The South Carolina Code2 provides that com-
pensation be paid for all "special injuries" which diminish the
value of adjacent land, and the court held that this would be an
adequate remedy at law under the state constitution. As to alle-
gations (2) and (3), supra, the court held that these were merely
conclusions, not facts, and as such were not admitted by the city's
demurrer. Furthermore, these allegations were found to be insuf-
ficient to characterize fraud, bad faith, or clear abuse of dis-
cretion.
Demurrer-Condemnation--Allegation of "Public Use"
In Tuomey Tosp. v. City of Sumter3 the court added a fourth
ground to those enumerated in the Bease case, supra. An alle-
gation that one's land is already devoted to a "public use" is
1. 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 25-161 to -170 (1962).
3. 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
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sufficient to state a cause of action in a suit to enjoin a con-
demnation proceeding.
The city of Sumter wished to acquire some land from the hos-
pital in order to widen a street. It was alleged by the hospital
that it had been incorporated and operated as a non-profit hos-
pital for nearly fifty years, as directed in the will of the late
Timothy J. Tuomey. It was further alleged that the land sought
to be condemned was already devoted to a public use. The city
demurred, but the trial judge overruled the demurrer and
granted a temporary restraining order.
The city appealed, but the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the question
of "public use" is a factual issue which must be determined under
the facts as developed upon a trial of the case. For purposes of
the demurrer it was sufficient to allege a "public use," so long
as there were other facts alleged which would tend to support
the conclusion. The court was careful to note that since the alle-
gation of "public use" was a conclusion drawn by the pleader
from other facts, it was not admitted as a matter of law by the
city's demurrer.
The exemption from condemnation of land "devoted to a pub-
lic use" is specified in the statute which governs eminent do-
main exercised by municipalities.4 In the instant case the court
implied that the allegation alone may not be sufficient. But sup-
port for the "public use" allegation was found in the allegation
as to the founder's charitable intentions and as to the non-profit
operation of the hospital. These allegations were enough to get
the "public use" allegation past a demurrer.
There is excellent dictum in the Tuomey case which discusses
the legal tests for finding that a "public use" existed. In this
article on Pleadings only a brief summary may be given. There
are many "charitable" institutions which may fall outside the
protective bounds of "public use." The mere facts that the insti-
tution is eleemosynary and beneficial to the public are not the
test. It must be shown that the public has a right to a definite
use of the property which is enforceable in a court of law.6
Demurrer--Improper Joinder-Foreign Corporation
Joinder as a defendant of a foreign corporation, over which
the court does not have jurisdiction, with an individual over
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-68.1 (1962).
5. 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744 (1964).
1965]
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whom the court does have jurisdiction was held in Gibbs V.
Young0 not to confer jurisdiction over the foreign corporate
defendant.
An accident occurred in Georgia, involving a truck which was
owned by an Alabama corporation, Bowman Transportation, Inc.
The truck was driven by a South Carolinian. A motorist from
California brought suit in South Carolina. Bowman had no
contact with South Carolina, except that its employee Young
resided there and that it was licensed to operate through the
state. Bowman demurred for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court
overruled the demurrer.
On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed. The
court indicated that where the state does not have jurisdiction
of the person, it must have jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Neither was present as to Bowman, since the accident took place
in Georgia. Section 10-214 of the Code of Laws of South Caro-
lina, 1962, provides for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
"... by a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the cause
of action shall have arisen or the subject matter of the action
shall be situate within this State." Here the statute clearly limits
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the plaintiff is not
a resident of South Carolina. And joinder with an individual
over whom the court does have jurisdiction does not change the
status of the foreign corporation. Jurisdiction is still absent.
A corollary holding in Gibbs v. Young was that the trial court
should also have granted to the defendant Young a change of
venue from Chesterfield to Anderson County, where Young re-
sided, since the court had no jurisdiction over the defendant
alleged to have jurisdictional "presence" in Chesterfield, i.e.,
Bowman.
Demurrer-Joinder of Joint Tort-Feasors
Two alleged joint tort-feasors may be joined in a single action
even though there is no allegation that they were acting "in con-
cert," according to Crowe v. Domestic Loans, In.
7
Plaintiff had borrowed money from two loan ompanies,
Domestic Loans, Inc. of Columbia and Lender's Inc. of West
Columbia. Unable to collect their respective claims, the tireless
creditors resorted to calling plaintiff's employer by phone. The
6. 242 S.C. 217, 130 S.E.2d 484 (1963).
7. 242 S.C. 310, 130 S.E.2d 845 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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employer then discharged plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit
against both Domestic and Lender's in Richland County for
tortious interference with plaintiff's contractual relationship
with his employer.
Domestic demurred on the ground that the complaint did not
allege any "concerted action" between the alleged joint tort-
feasors, i.e., that there was no agency, no conspiracy, and no
knowledge of each other's actions. The demurrer was overruled,
and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The court seemed to accept the defendants' contention that
their actions were independent and unrelated but found that this
was not the controlling consideration. Its position seems to be in
line with the majority notion that where there has been a single
injury caused by two or more persons acting either in concert
or independently of each other, the wrongdoers are jointly and
severally liable and thus subject to joinder.8 Also section 10-203
of the Code states that all persons who may have an interest in
the controversy may be defendants, and many cases have held
generally that this provision is to be liberally construed. In addi-
tion, equitable considerations favor joinder.
Damaging Allegations Binding
It is settled that a party to an action is judicially bound by
his own pleadings. A companion rule is that the party may not
introduce evidence that contradicts his own pleadings.0 In the
recent case of Elrod v. All1 0 these well-known rules were slighted
by imprecise pleading, proving fatal to the action.
An automobile guest passenger injured in a two-car accident
attempted to sue his host-motorist and the operator of the other
automobile in a single action. Under the Guest Statute" recovery
from the host-motorist requires a showing of intentional or reck-
less misconduct. Simple negligence is not sufficient.
In his enthusiasm to plead a strong case against the other
motorist, the guest passenger alleged that the host-motorist was
operating his automobile "at a reasonable rate of speed, in a
careful and prudent manner ... " He further alleged that the
8. See generally 39 Am. JuR. Parties § 40; accord, Pendleton Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Columbia Ry., 133 S.C. 326, 131 S.E. 265 (1926).
9. Truesdale v. Jones, 224 S.C. 237, 78 S.E.2d 274 (1953).
10. 243 S.C. 425, 134 S.E.2d 410 (1964).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
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acts of the other motorist caused the host to be "faced with a
sudden peril."
A verdict against the host-motorist was unanimously reversed
by the South Carolina Supreme Court and was remanded for
entry of judgment for the defendant host-motorist under the
rules of the South Carolina Supreme Court.12 The allegation that
the host was reasonable and prudent bound plaintiff and pre-
cluded any finding of gross or wilful negligence, which is
prerequisite to a recovery under the guest statute. In addition,
the allegation of "sudden peril" caused by the other motorist
was binding, and where there is a "sudden peril," the driver can-
not be held to his ordinary standard of care.
Thus the cause of action was forfeited because of a failure to
plead the facts so as to be consistent with the legal theory of
recovery. This case illustrates the danger of imprecise pleading
where joint tort-feasors are joined in a single action.
Necessary Allegations-WrongfuZ Death
In actions for wrongful death against the South Carolina
Highway Department, it must be alleged that the decedent was
not contributorily negligent.13 Patrick v. South Carolina High-
way Dep't"4 held that this statute applies to the wrongful death
of a minor also, and even though the decedent's parents are the
beneficiaries of an action for the minor, the statute does not
require any allegation that the parents were not contributorily
negligent.
The court raised another interesting question. It is arguable
that the allegation of no contributory negligence, as required by
the statute, supra, may not be necessary where the deceased party
is a child too young to be capable of contributory negligence in
the eyes of the law. However, the court did not try to answer this
question.
Unnecessary Allegations-Estoppel
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, estoppel need not
be pleaded. The same does not apply to waiver, however.
In Spencer v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co.15 the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court sustained a directed verdict against the com-
12. S.C. Sup. CT. RuLE 27.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-233 (1962).
14. 243 S.C. 246, 133 S.E.2d 750 (1963).
15. 243 S.C. 317, 133 S.E.2d 826 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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pany, rejecting the contention that plaintiff had to plead estop-
pel. The court distinguished estoppel from the doctrine of waiver,
noting by contrast that while waiver is "an intentional relin-
quishment of a known right, the essential elements of estoppel
are the ignorance of the party who invokes the estoppel. .... ,16
Estoppel need not be pleaded.
In the Spencer case estoppel arose from the oral representa-
tions of the insurance company's agent. The county of Florence
agreed with the agent to switch its group life policy to the de-
fendant company on the condition that all those county em-
ployees already covered by group insurance would be covered
by the new policy and that there would be no gap or waiting
period and no new terms which would exclude those already
receiving coverage.
The written contract of insurance which arrived a month after
the policy became effective contained a clause excluding em-
ployees not actively at work on the day the policy became effec-
tive. The dispute arose over an employee who had become ill and
unable to work shortly before the new policy with the defendant
company took effect. In the face of the oral assurances of the
company's agent that there would be uninterrupted coverage for
all employees, the company was estopped to assert the terms of
the written contract even though the estoppel was not set out in
the complaint.
Superfluous Allegations-SchooZ Bus Liability
Two cases have held recently that allegations of gross negli-
gence, recklessness, and the like are irrelevant in an action against
the insurer of a school bus owned by the state.1 This is so be-
cause a statute limits the liability of the state to actual damages
for simple negligence.i8 The statute also sets up the following
limits: (1) $5,000 per person for personal injuries; (2) $5,000
total property damage; (3) $25,000 over-all limitation per acci-
dent, personal and property damage included. Therefore allega-
tions in excess of the stated liability and allegations of gross
negligence which would give rise to punitive damages may and
should be stricken upon motion.
16. Id. at 322, 133 S.E.2d at 828; Ellis v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 133
S.E.2d at 828 (1963), quoting from 187 S.C. 162, 167, 197 S.E. 510, 512 (1938).
17. Sossamon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87
(1964); Coker v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 170, 133 S.E.2d 122
1963).
18. S.C. CoDE AxN. § 21-840 (1962).
1965]
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Parties-Foreign Wrongful Death Statute
Designation of parties who may maintain an action for wrong-
ful death under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is a substantive
element of the basic right to recover. Therefore the parties named
in the foreign statute must institute the action, without regard
to who would be the proper parties in a similar action arising in
South Carolina.
The Georgia Wrongful Death Statute requires that the action
must be instituted by the beneficiaries of the action as named in
the statute, not by the representatives of the decedent's estate.
Thus the South Carolina Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Me-
Daniel held that it was proper for the trial court to dismiss an
action arising out of a death in Georgia which had been insti-
tuted by the administrator of the estate rather than by the de-
cedent's spouse and son, who were beneficiaries under the Georgia
statute.
The law of the place in which the transaction occurred, lex
loci, governs all substantive rights; whereas, the law of the forum
in which the action is brought, lex fori, prevails as to purely
procedural matters. The determination of who shall have the
right to recover is substantive. There is ample authority for this
proposition cited in the McDaniel case. Apparently under Geor-
gia law the recovery may go directly to the beneficiaries without
going through the estate. In contrast many jurisdictions require
that the recovery go throuigil the estate, in which case it is sub-
ject to the claims of creditors. In this context the substantive
nature of the designation of parties who may bring the action
becomes clearer.
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
A complaint for declaratory judgment is sufficient on demur-
rer if it sets forth a "justiciable controversy." It need not state
a cause of action. That is to say, it does not have to demonstrate
upon its most favorable allegations that the plaintiff has a right
to recover. It is sufficient if it makes reasonable allegations that
a controversy exists which should be delineated by a declaration
of the rights of the parties. There may be a "justiciable con-
troversy" even if on the face of the complaint it appears that
the plaintiff may be on the losing side of the controversy. This
writer realizes that the reader's thirst to understand what a
19. 243 S.C. 286, 133 S.E.2d 809 (1963).
[Vol. 17
7
Harley: Pleading
Published by Scholar Commons,
PLEADING SURVEYED
"justiciable controversy" is has not been satisfied by these re-
marks. And yet it might be misleading to attempt a more definite
description.
In Ilardwick v. Liberty Hut. Ins. Co.20 the South Carolina
Supreme Court found a "justiciable controversy." Plaintiff had
an accident in an automobile owned by Capital-U-Drive-It.
Plaintiff alleged that she was induced by an agent of Capital to
rely on Capital's insurer, defendant Liberty Mutual, to indem-
nify the accident. In so relying plaintiff alleged that she for-
feited her own insurance coverage. Then Liberty Mutual denied
liability. Plaintiff on information and belief alleged that she
might be entitled to coverage under Liberty Mutual's policy on
Capital. Plaintiff alleged the existence of an insurance contract
but was unable to allege its terms.
The court concluded that whether or not these allegations
stated a cause of action, they did state a "justiciable contro-
versy." In reaching this result the court also utilized the doctrine
that when facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the de-
fendant, i.e., the alleged insurance policy in this case, the plain-
tiff is not required to plead with the ordinary degree of certainty
as to the specific grounds for his right of recovery.
In passing it should be noted that the court also stated that
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 21 the traditional
distinction between "necessary" and "proper" parties was ap-
plicable. Therefore the plaintiff's insurer, who had denied lia-
bility for failure to give notice, was not a necessary party to the
action against Liberty Mutual, although it would have been a
proper party had plaintiff chosen to bring his insurer in.
Late Pleadings-Default
In his discretion the trial judge may declare a late pleader in
default, and, absent an abuse, the South Carolina Supreme Court
will not disturb his decision on appeal. Two decisions recently
upheld default judgments for failure to plead timely.
22
In Irick v. Carr the defendant, a businessman, was declared
in default when he failed to answer the complaint in twenty days.
The first attempt to take action occurred within thirty days after
service of the complaint. At that time defendant tried to excuse
20. 243 S.C. 162, 133 S.E.2d 71 (1963).
21. S.C. CeDE ANN. § 10-2008 (1962).
22. Irick v. Carr, 243 S.C. 565, 135 S.E.2d 94 (1964); Odell v. United Ins.
Co. of America, 243 S.C. 35, 132 S.E.2d 14 (1963).
1965]
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his omission by claiming emotional stress caused by his mother's
illness and worry caused by his business. The trial judge refused
to permit a late answer.
On affirming the default judgment, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court recognized that the trial court has wide discretion
to relieve a party from default where there is excusable neglect.
But he is not bound to do so. The court found no abuse of dis-
cretion in the trial court's finding that defendant was qualified
to know the nature of the action and that it was wilful neglect
for him to plead late.
CoImZ E. HIAuIs
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